This paper deals with the effect of information and uncertainty on profits in an unobservable single server queueing system. We consider scenarios in which the service rate, or the service quality, or the waiting conditions are random variables that are known to the server but not to the customers. We ask whether the server is motivated to reveal these parameters. We investigate the structure of the profit function, and its sensitivity to the variance of the random variable. We consider and compare variations of the model according to whether or not the server can modify the service price after observing the realization of the random variable.
Introduction
There is a growing interest in queueing models where servers and customers react to each other's action, such as prices and queue discipline set by the server, and arrival process generated in a non-cooperative way by the customers (see [9] for a survey). Much of the literature on this subject assumes that the system's parameters are fixed and known to the participating agents. In other cases, customers own private information on the individual parameters, and one asks whether an adequate pricing system can be used to motivate them to reveal this information to the queue operator. In contrast, this paper deals with the common situation where some parameters are random variables whose realization at a particular time is known to the queue operator but not to the potential customers. For example, the rate of service may vary due to various reasons, the quality of the service may be subject to changes, and even the conditions of waiting in the queue which may be of importance to a customer when deciding on whether or not to join, may vary. The subject of this paper is the effect that this uncertainty has on the decisions made by the server and the customers, and in particular on the expected rate of profit. We ask whether or not the server is motivated to reveal the information, what is the effect of increased uncertainty, and what happens when the server is restricted to a fixed price independent of the realization of the random variable.
Several papers have dealt with the value of information in congested systems. Some have proved that information may reduce customers' welfare. This phenomenon can be broadly interpreted as a result of the non-cooperative way in which customers behave.
Hassin [6] asked whether forcing a profit maximizing server to inform customers about the length of the queue is necessarily beneficial, given that with (or without) this information, customers' behavior is not necessarily optimal. It turns out that, depending on the input parameters, it may or it may not be desired to reveal the length of the queue in front of a profit maximizing server to customers who consider whether or not to join it.
Guo and Zipkin [5] considered customers with time values uniformly distributed on [0,1], and three levels of delay information: no information, length of queue, and exact waiting time.
They show how to compute the performance measures in the three systems. Their model has no entry pricing, and welfare increases when more accurate delay information is available.
Debo, Parlour, and Rajan [4] consider a firm that knows the quality of the service it provides but cannot credibly communicate it to its potential customers. There are two types of customers, characterized by their private signal on the quality of the service. Customers update their beliefs after observing the length of the queue and decide whether or not to join. The authors show that in general, when waiting in the queue is costly, the equilibrium behavior is not of the threshold type. Other results on the value of information in queueing systems are discussed in [1, 7, 8, 10] .
Arnott, de Palma, and Lindsey [2, 3] analyzed effects of information on participation and time-of-use decisions in congestible systems, when capacity and demand fluctuate. Other papers dealing with related questions are mentioned in these references. They conclude that with appropriate price regulation of the system, added information can improve the efficiency of the system. Otherwise, the effect of information may be negative.
In this paper, we consider a structured model of a congested system -that of a Markovian queue managed by a single server who aims to maximize profits. To simplify the derivations we assume that the random variable in question may only obtain two values. For this model, we are able to obtain explicit answers to the effect of information about the system's parameters on the servers profits and system's overall welfare.
We consider an M/M/1 system with a large potential demand of risk neutral customers, service rate µ, waiting cost of C per unit time, entry fee T , and value of service R. The queue length is unobservable to the customers while making their decision of whether or not to join it. We consider three types of uncertainty, defined by assuming that a random parameter takes on one of two values. In the first, the capacity of the server, measured by µ is random. In the second, the cost of spending time in the system, as reflected by C, is random. In the third, the quality of the service as reflected by R is a random variable For example, the service rate and quality may depend on the particular server on duty, and the waiting cost may be affected by local time-variable conditions or quality of accommodation.
In each case we consider three sub-models. In the first, the customers are not informed about the realized value of the random parameter. In particular, this means that the server sets a single price independent of the realized value of the parameter, because price differentiation may serve as a signal to the customers about the value of the parameter. 1 In the other two cases, the realized value is revealed to the customers. In the second case, the server may set a different price for each realized value, charging a higher fee for better quality or for faster service. In the third case this is not possible, for example, because the server cannot observe the realized value, or because it is technically impossible or too costly to modify the prices.
Main results
For a given set of parameters and information, customers join the system according to a (Nash) equilibrium rate. By our assumption of large potential demand, this rate is such that a customer is indifferent between joining and not joining. This means that both in the case of uninformed customers and in the case of informed customers and two prices, the expected net benefit of a customer, after deduction of the admission fee and waiting cost, is 0. It is well known (see for example [9] ) that since in this case the server extracts all the customer surplus, the server's objective coincides with the social objective, and therefore the server's decisions conform with welfare maximization. Note that with informed customers and a single price, customers may have positive surplus and the profit maximizing solution is in general not socially optimal.
Let Π un , Π in 1 , and Π in 2 denote the server's maximum profit when customers are uninformed or informed, and in the latter case when a single price or two prices are set by the server, respectively. Since customers arrival rate in equilibrium under the profit maximizing policy is socially optimal, additional information to the customers can only increase social welfare.
However, when the server is restricted to a single 1 See [11] for how price may serve as a signal for quality.
price, there is no straightforward answer to whether or not informing the customers increases profits (and social welfare). We find that with uncertain service rate or waiting cost, Π in 1 ≥ Π un . However, with uncertain value of service this inequality does not hold in general. In particular, when the waiting cost is sufficiently small we get the reverse inequality.
• For uncertain service rate, we prove (Theorem 4.3) a result which is stronger than the obvious Π in 2 ≥ Π un : Informing customers is desired even if the price is exogenously fixed, and is not optimally set by the server. Moreover, the difference between the profits obtained with informed and uninformed customers increases with the amount of uncertainty. Note that in such a case customers enjoy a positive consumer surplus and the server's objective differs from the social objective.
• With uncertain waiting cost, for prices that induce positive demand in the case with no information, the same level of social welfare is attained no matter whether customers are informed or not, but informing customers may be beneficial when one of the possible values of the waiting cost is so high that without information no customers will show up.
• With uncertain quality of service and a single price, when the difference between the possible values of service is large, the optimal price is so high that no customer will choose to arrive if the low value is realized. It follows that, for small values of C, the server is motivated to conceal the realized value of service from the customers. For large values of C the opposite is true.
The effect of increasing uncertainty on the three profit functions is different from case to case:
• With informed customers and two prices, increasing the variance has a positive effect on profits and welfare in all three types of uncertainty that we consider.
• With informed customers and a single price, the effect is positive except for when the variance is small and the random variable is the quality of service.
• With uniformed customers, profits are independent of the variance when the random variable is the waiting cost or quality of service. However, with random service rate, profits decrease as the variance increases.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 3 we describe the well-known outcome of the model when all parameters are known with certainty. Sections 4,5, and 6 deal with uncertain service rate, waiting cost, and quality of service, respectively. Each section is divided into five subsections. The first three deal with the cases of uninformed customers, informed customers with two prices, and informed customers with a single price, respectively. The fourth subsection compares the results and draws conclusions on the effect of the assumptions on the server's expected profit. The last subsection analyzes the effect of uncertainty, as expressed by the variance of the random variable, in each of the three models.
Background
For given values of the parameter R, C, µ, and T , if R − T < C µ then the equilibrium arrival rate is 0. Otherwise, it satisfies
Suppose that R, C, and µ are given, and that T is a decision variable. The rate of profit is Π = λT . If R < C µ then it is not possible to gain any profits. Otherwise, Π is optimized by setting
Thus, the maximum rate of profit is
(see, for example, Table 3 .2 in [9] ). In the following we measure uncertainty by the variance of the random parameter. Suppose that the uncertain parameter is q and it obtains the values q 1 and q 2 with probabilities p and 1 − p respectively. Denote its expected value byq, then,
We consider two ways of controlling the variance. In one we fix q 1 and obtain desired values of V ar(q) andq by adjusting p and q 2 . In the other we fix p and adjust q 1 and q 2 . In both types we maintain a constant value ofq = pq 1 + (1 − p)q 2 . Thus, q 2 =q −pq1
4 Uncertain service rate
Assume that µ = µ 1 with probability p, and µ = µ 2 with probability 1 − p, where
Thus, v and r represent the values of service and net gain from service after deduction of service fee, respectively, normalized with respect to the time value.
Uniformed customers
Without loss of generality,
since otherwise λ = 0 and Π = 0. The proof of the following lemma is given in the appendix:
The equilibrium value of v is a root of
We solve the above polynomial for v and then compute Π un = λT = λ(R − Cv). 
Informed customers -two prices
Suppose that customers are informed about the service rate, and the server charges different prices depending on the realization of µ. In this case we use (2) to obtain that the server's rate of profit is
Informed customers -single price
Assume that the firm must set a fixed price, and cannot change it when the value of µ is revealed. Customers are informed however about the realized value of µ. Assume first that the price T is not too large, so that λ > 0 for both values of µ. The arrival rate, given µ = µ i , is λ i = µ i − C R−T . The expected arrival rate, given T , is
The expected rate of profit, given T , is Π(T ) = T λ. Its derivative with respect to T isμ
The first-order optimality condition isμ C (R − T ) 2 − R = 0, which gives
Since T < R is required, only the root associated with the minus is relevant, and λ =μ − Cμ R . Therefore,
The firm may choose however a high price which doesn't attract any customers if µ = µ 2 . In this situation, the firm will set the price to gain maximum profit when the high rate is realized. Thus, T = R − CR µ1 , as in (1), and
The firm will choose the solution giving the higher value between (7) and (8) . The two values are equal if
In our numerical solution we obtained at most two real roots that satisfy (4), only one of which corresponds to an equilibrium, see Remark6.1. 
Remark 4.2 By concavity of the square root function, p
can be used to show that
, for any p ∈ (0, 1).
Denote the resulting profit by Π in 1 , then
Discussion
Denote by λ in (T ) the equilibrium expected arrival rate when customers are informed and there is a single price T . Similarly, let λ un (T ) be the arrival rate when customers are not informed. 
Proof: By (6) and (19), we need to prove that μ
This is equivalent to 1 − (1 − 2p) 2 ≥ 0, and the claim follows.
Note that the inequality in the theorem is strict except for when p ∈ {0, 1}, the case with no uncertainty. The difference in the expected arrival rates is concave and it is maximized when p = 1 2 . Thus, we may say that the difference in the expected arrival rates increases with the amount of uncertainty.
Also note that the range of prices in the theorem is the allowed range for the uninformed customers case. For the informed customers case, the allowed range is wider, and in the added values we have λ in (T ) > 0 whereas λ un (T ) = 0, conforming with the spirit of the theorem.
Therefore, the firm is motivated to reveal the realized value of µ to its customers.
Proof: The first inequality is obvious, and the second follows from Theorem 4.3
The relative behavior of the profit functions under the three models differs in different regions of r as follows (we use here the inequality η > 1 µ2 given in Remark 4.2):
• If r ∈
• Figure 1 (left) gives the expected rate of profit for p = 0.2, C = 30, µ 1 = 1.5 and µ 2 = 0.5.
3
Remark 4.5 Clearly, when p = 1 we have
The functions when p → 1 are illustrated in Figure 1 (right). The reason is that when p = 1 we may have µ 2 < λ < µ 1 , whereas for any p < 1 we must have λ < µ 2 to guarantee a finite value for the expected waiting time. 4 Actually, the value λ = µ 1 − cµ1 R for p = 1, is given by the root corresponding to the plus sign in (18). 
The effect of uncertainty
We consider two types of changes in uncertainty. In both types we fixμ.
In the first case we also fix µ 1 >μ (recall that µ 1 > µ 2 ), and simultaneously change p and µ 2 so thatμ is preserved at the same level and V ar(µ) varies. In Figure 2 (left) we assumed µ = 2 and µ 1 = 2.5, so that by (3) V ar(µ) = p 4(1−p) . We note that this is an increasing function of p. In the second case we fix p and modify µ 1 and µ 2 , again preservingμ. In Figure 2 (right) we set p = 0.5 andμ = 2, giving V ar(µ) = (µ 1 − 2)
2 . As expected from (9), Π The function √ µ − 1 2 is convex. Suppose that V ar(µ) is increased while maintainingμ.
Then, Π in 2 in the first two cases of (5) also increases. Therefore, Π in 2 , which is the maximum of these two expressions (and 0) is a nondecreasing function of the variance (and strictly increasing where the profit is positive).
Finally, Π un decreases when the variance increases due to the convexity of the expected waiting time as a function of λ for any given µ. , are 20, 52, and 60, respectively. 4 In the other cases that we consider later, where C or R are random, we naturally have Π un = Π 
Uncertain waiting cost
Suppose that C = C 1 with probability p and C = C 2 with the complementary probability, where C 1 < C 2 . Denote the expected value of C byC = pC 1 + (1 − p)C 2 .
Uniformed customers
Given a price T , the equilibrium arrival rate is λ = µ −C R−T + . By (2), the maximum rate of profit is
Informed customers -two prices
Suppose that customers are informed about the service rate, and the server charges different prices depending on the realization of C. Then,
Informed customers -single price
Given the price T and the information that C i is realized, the equilibrium arrival rate is
The expected rate of profit is then
This is the same expression as in the uniformed customers case and the maximum profit is
Expression (12) is correct if the maximizing price satisfies T < R − C1 µ . Otherwise, it underestimates the profit by assuming a negative λ 2 , whereas the true value is 0. For T ∈ (R − C2 µ , R − C1 µ ) we have λ 1 > 0 and λ 2 = 0. In this range, the profit maximizing price is R − RC1 µ and the profit is
We compare (13) with (12) to compute the maximum possible profit given R and µ. Thus,
The two values are equal if
Note that from C 2 > C 1 it follows that γ > C 1 . Therefore,
Discussion
The relative behavior of the profit functions under the three models differs in different regions of Rµ defined by 0 ≤ C 1 ≤C ≤ C 2 ≤ γ < ∞ as follows: Figure 3 shows the profit functions for p = 0.2, C 1 = 20, and C 2 = 80. The variable corresponding to the x axis is Rµ which is the value produced by the server per unit of time of service.
Therefore, the firm is motivated to reveal the realized value of C to its customers. 
The effect of uncertainty
We consider two types of changes in uncertainty. In both types we fixC. In the first case we also fix C 1 ≤C (recall that C 1 ≤ C 2 ), and simultaneously change p and C 2 so thatC is preserved at the same level. In Figure 4 (left) we assumedC = 30 and C 1 = 20 giving by (3, V ar(µ) = 100 p 1−p . In the second case we fix p and modify C 1 and C 2 , again preservingC. An increase in C 1 comes with an adequate decrease of C 2 . In Figure 4 (right) we assumed p = 0.5 andC = 30 giving, by (2), V ar(µ) = (C 1 − 30) 2 . , and equivalently V ar(C) > 200. In Figure 4 (left) the analogous condition is C1 ≤ 10 or V ar(C) ≤ 400.
Similarly, from (10) 6 Uncertain quality of service Let R = R 1 with probability p, and R = R 2 with the complementary probability. Assume R 1 > R 2 and that µ and C are fixed.
Uninformed customers
Given a price T , the equilibrium arrival rate is λ = µ − C R−T + . By (2) , he maximum rate of profit is
Informed customers -two prices
Suppose that customers are informed about the service quality, and the server charges different prices depending on the realization of R. Then,
Informed customers -single price
For a given price T , the arrival rate is
To have positive gain, the price cannot exceed R 1 − C µ . We distinguish the two cases according to whether or not T < R 2 − C µ .
• Consider first the case T < R 2 − C µ : The expected profit is
The first-order optimality conditions are
Multiplication by
This gives the following polynomial
• Suppose now that T ≥ R 2 − C µ . In this case λ 2 = 0 and the optimal price gives profit
Figure 5 (left) shows the profit as a function of the price for C = 20, p = 0.2, R 1 = 70, µ = 1, and R 2 = 30. With these parameters R 2 − C µ = 10, and we see that the server gains more by raising the price to a level that induces no arrivals when R 2 is realized. Lowering R 1 to 60 and increasing R 2 to 40 (and then R 2 − C µ = 20) we obtain a new situation, shown in Figure  5 (right), in which it is worth lowering the price to attract customers also when R 2 is realized. 
Discussion
When C is close to 0,
Thus, for small values of C, if the server is restricted to a single price, the server is motivated to conceal the realized value of R from the customers. However, for large values of C the opposite is true. Figure 6 gives the profits as a function of C, when R 1 = 100,R 2 = 30, p = 0.2, and µ = 1. Note that these are actually functions of C µ . 8 
The effect of uncertainty
We fixR and thus R 2 =R −R2p 1−p . In the first case we also fix R 1 ≥R (recall that R 1 > R 2 ), and simultaneously change p and R 2 so thatR is preserved. In Figure 7 (left) we assumed R = 30 and R 1 = 50 giving (by (3)) V ar(µ) = 400 2 . We see that Π un only depends onR and is not affected by the change in uncertainty, as expected from (15). We also see that in the case of informed customers and two prices, profits increase with uncertainty. However, in the case of a single price, profits initially decrease as a function of the variance, and only for larger variance there is an increase. where
Note that by our assumptions that p ∈ (0, 1) and µ 1 > µ 2 , it follows that S is strictly positive. The derivative of λ with respect to v is
and with respect to T
The profit Π un is equal to λT . The first-order optimality condition is T λ T + λ = 0, or
Multiply by 2S (allowed since S > 0):
Substitute T = R − vC:
Remark 6.1 Figure 8 shows the roots as a function of R, with p = 0.2, µ 1 = 1.5, and µ 2 = 0.5. The figure shows the real roots that satisfy 0 ≤ T ≤ R − C . (Recall that by (4) T must be bounded this way. 10 ) For large values of R we get two such roots, marked Π Figure 8 , does not correspond to a new equilibrium. Substituting these values in (20) we obtain that the left-hand side is negative, whereas the right-hand side is positive (and equal to the left-hand side in its absolute value). Thus, the root Π 
